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Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium assignment model of workers to tasks with
endogenous human capital formation and multidimensionality of skills. The model has 2
key features. First, skills are endogenous and multidimensional. Second, two types
of assignment occur, workers self-select their education and firms assign workers to
tasks/machines. This assignment model yields two functions mapping skills of each type
to tasks. Equilibrium is characterized by diﬀerent wage functions for each type of skills,
so that the wage distributions generally overlap. This model oﬀers a unique framework
to analyze changes in the wage structure within and between skills groups of workers
and distinguishes between technological change that is related to machines (the technical
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factor) or related to workers (the human factor). I show both theoretically and through
simulations that the model can reproduce simultaneously i) the overlap in the wage dis-
tributions of college and high-school graduates, ii) the rise in the college-premium, iii)
the rise in within wage inequality iv) the diﬀerential behavior of the between and within
wage inequality in the 60s and 70s and, v) the decline of the wage at the 1st decile of
the overall wage distribution. A family of closed form solutions for the wage functions
is proposed. In this family, the output of worker-task pairs is Cobb-Douglas, tasks are
distributed according to a Beta distribution and the mapping functions have a logistic
form.
JEL Classification: D3, J21, J23 and J31.
Keywords: Endogenous human capital formation, tasks assignment, substitution, tech-
nical change and wage distribution.
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.1 Introduction
This paper is about the assignment of heterogenous workers to heterogenous tasks and the im-
pact of technical change on the distribution of wages. In assignment models, wage diﬀerentials
between workers arise from productivity diﬀerentials between workers. These productivity dif-
ferentials are initiated by skills diﬀerentials and magnified through the assignment of more able
workers to more productive tasks in equilibrium. The equilibrium wage structure therefore
depends on the distribution of skills, the distribution of tasks and the productivity of worker-
task pairs. This means that changes in the wage structure could arise through the human
factor,1 i.e. changes in the distribution of skills, or through the technical factor, i.e. changes
in the distribution of tasks,2 but also through changes in the productivity of worker-task pairs
over time. In turn, these productivity changes could be initiated either by the technical factor,
i.e. improvements in the productivity of tasks,3 or the human factor, i.e. improvements in the
productivity of workers. While the technical factor is directly linked to technological change,
the human factor could arise from either improvements of the way workers perform their tasks
−a new technique− or improvements in variables aﬀecting skills formation −and hence the
distribution of skills− like the quality of school, family background, childhood environment
or even genetical inheritance (see among others Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Heckman
(2007)). Assignment models therefore oﬀer a unique framework to analyze (changes in) the
wage structure as they allow us to distinguish the contribution of technical factors from the
contribution of human factors.
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium assignment model of workers to tasks with
endogenous human capital formation and multidimensional skills. The first key feature that
distinguishes this model from the existing literature on assignment models (see Sattinger (1975,
1979 and 1993), Teulings (1995a, 1995b and 2005), Costrell and Loury (2004) and Terviö
1I owe the terminology technical factor versus human factor to Frank Levy.
2Think for instance of the job polarization observed in the US (see Autor et al. (2006)) and UK (see Goos
and Manning (2007)) in recent years.
3This is the classical approach in the literature on skilled-biased technical change. See among others,
Acemoglu (2002), Autor et al. (2003), Beaudry and Green (2003), Berman et al. (1994), Berman et al.
(1998), Bound and Johnson (1992), Breshnahan (1999), Bresnahan et al. (2002), Brynjolfsson (1995), Card
and Lemieux (2001), Katz and Murphy (1992), Krueger (1993) and Krusell et al. (2000).
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(2007)) is that skills are endogenous and multidimensional. In existing assignment models the
distribution of skills is exogenous. Human capital formation occurs outside of the model and
a distinction between the contribution of either school quality, family background, childhood
environment or genetical inheritance in changes in the distribution of skills over time and
hence wage inequality is not possible. Moreover, skills are assumed to be unidimensional or,
which boils down to the same thing, the importance of the respective types of skills is assumed
constant over time so that the vector of skills can be aggregated into a single component. This
assumption, however, seems to be at odds with recent empirical literature led by Heckman and
Rubinstein (2001) that emphasizes the importance of noncognitive skills, such as personality
traits, in explaining earnings. Moreover, the unidimensionality assumption fails to explain
why the wage distributions of workers with diﬀerent education overlap. This is of importance
since the distribution of earnings of high-school graduates overlaps, in average over the last
4 decades, 1/3 of the distribution of earnings of college graduates as illustrated in Figure
1.4 This overlap is extremely persistent as it remained around 25% in 2002 after 25 years of
tremendous increase in the demand for skills.
Theoretically, the most plausible alternative to explain the overlap of the wage distributions
of college and high-school graduates is imperfect capital markets. Suppose individuals are
endowed with a single ability, for instance cognitive ability, but face short term liquidity
constraints at the time they choose whether or not to go to college. In that case, smart but
poor individuals will not have access to college education. Since these individuals have high
ability however, they might end up with a higher wage than some college graduates. This
short-term credit constraint generates an overlap of the earnings distribution of college and
high-school graduates. At first sight, this explanation seems to be plausible as empirical results
reveal a strong correlation between family income and post-secondary schooling. However,
the empirical content of the imperfect capital markets explanation is weak. Carneiro and
Heckman’s (2002) careful analyzes show that “at most 8% of American youth are subject to
short term liquidity constraints that aﬀect their post-secondary schooling.” Hence, the capital
market imperfection explanation must be ruled out as it only explains a marginal share of the
4I consider herewith only white males working full-time full year, between 30 and 35 years old. The overlap
is measured by Mann-Whitney statistic. This statistic is derived by matching N randomly selected high-school
graduates with N randomly selected college graduates and reporting the percentage of pairs in which the high-
school graduate earns more than the college graduates. Murphy and Welch (1992) documented an average
overlap of 24% in the period 1985-1990, as measured by Mann-Withney statistic, for white males with equal
experience (20-39 years) using wage data from the wage-earner questionnaire for outgoing rotations.
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observed overlap.
To explain the apparent strong correlation between family income and educational choice,
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) propose an alternative explanation to short term liquidity con-
straints. They suggest that family income at the time children make their educational decision
is strongly correlated with family income over the child’s life cycle so that the correlation be-
tween family income and educational choice does not reflect short term liquidity constraints
but rather indicates that families with higher resources in a child’s formative years help their
children to develop their abilities relatively more compared to families with limited resources.
At the time children make their post-secondary educational choice, “rich” children have higher
abilities which lead them to choose for college degrees whereas “poor” children have limited
abilities and quit school after high-school.
The model developed in this paper implicitly takes into account the fact that more favor-
able family backgrounds and other environment factors help fostering a child’s cognitive and
noncognitive abilities. In the model, ability endowments capture abilities at the time indi-
viduals make their educational choice, and hence, measure abilities at the end of compulsory
education. The exact definition of abilities therefore encompasses pure ability endowment
individuals were born with and the contribution of factors aﬀecting a child’s abilities up until
the end of compulsory education, i.e. family background and environment.5
The second key feature that distinguishes the model from the existing literature on assign-
ment models is that two types of assignment occur.6 The first type of assignment is workers’s
educational self-selection. Workers are initially endowed with abilities of two types and can
choose out of two types of education that each transforms abilities into marketable skills in
5Heckman et al. (2006) define their cognitive and noncognitive factors in a similar fashion.
6To my knowledge, the assignment model in this paper is the only model that yields two mapping functions
and hence two wage functions in equilibrium. However, among others, Lucas (1978),(Lucas 1978) Rosen (1982)
and more recently Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) developed one-sided assignment models in which two
types of assignment occur. First, depending on their abilities, agents are assigned to occupations, either
worker or manager. Above a certain threshold of ability agents become managers while below that threshold,
agents become workers. After this initial assignment, groups of workers are assigned to managers. However,
these models give rise to a single mapping function that maps ability to occupations. Hence, equilibrium
is characterized by a single monotonic wage function so that the most able worker earns less than the least
able manager, there is no overlap between the earnings of workers and managers. Interestingly enough, Epple
et al. (2006) developed a general equilibrium model of the market for higher education in which students
are heterogenous in terms of (household) income and endowed ability and colleges are heterogenous in terms
of (mean students) quality and tuition. The problem for students is to choose the college that maximizes
their (household) utility and the problem for colleges is to maximize (peer-)quality by setting the appropriate
selection rule and tuition level. In equilibrium, each college has a distinct admision rule. These decision rules
slant the income/ability plan into regions (colleges) in a way that is analogous to the assignment of agents to
occupations in one-sided assignment models.
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diﬀerent proportions. Educational self-selection endogenizes human capital formation. Work-
ers specialize and supply their skills of the type that maximizes their earnings. The second
type of assignment is the assignment of workers to tasks. Each task refers to a diﬀerent type of
machine. To produce output, this machine needs to be operated by one and only one worker.
Although the various machines can be operated by workers with diﬀerent types and levels of
skills, workers of diﬀerent types and levels of skills diﬀer in their productivity. For instance,
if productivity is so that i) workers of each skills type have a comparative advantage on a
diﬀerent side of the support of tasks, ii) within types of skills, more skilled workers have an
absolute advantage and iii) workers’ skills complement the characteristics of machines in pro-
duction then, following Ricardo’s principles of comparative advantage7 and diﬀerential rents,
equilibrium in this model is characterized by two mapping functions, one for each type of skills
supplied. The first mapping function is decreasing and maps skills of the first type to tasks on
the left hand side of the support. The second mapping function is increasing and maps skills
of the other type to tasks on the right hand side of the support. These two mapping functions
generate two wage functions, one for each type of skills, that will in general overlap.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related
literature. Section 3 discusses the model of tasks assignment with endogenous human capital
formation and multidimensional skills. Section 4 presents types of technical changes so that the
model reproduces simultaneously i) a rise in the college supply, ii) a stable college-premium
and, iii) a rise in within wage inequality as observed in the 70s in the US. In section 5, a
family of closed form solutions for the wage functions is proposed. In this family, the output
of worker-task pairs is Cobb-Douglas, tasks are distributed according to a Beta distribution
and the mapping functions have a logistic form. For some parameter values, one can derive
analytically the shape of the wage functions in equilibrium and the distribution of wages within
and between educational groups. Numerical simulations show that the model can reproduce
accurately i) the rise in the college supply, ii) the rise in the college-premium, iii) the rise in
within wage inequality, iv) the diﬀerential behavior of the between and within wage inequality
in the 70s and, v) the decline of the wage at the 1st decile of the overall wage distribution.
Section 6 concludes.
7The theory of comparative advantage in labor markets was formally developed by Sattinger (1975) (see
also Sattinger (1993) for a survey of assignment models and comparative advantage) and the presence of
comparative advantage was later demonstrated empirically in Sattinger (1978 and 1980).
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2 Related literature
Related to the model developed in this paper is the model of self-selection proposed by Roy
(1950 and 1951), and extended by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985 and 1990) and Heckman
and Honore (1990) and estimated in the context of educational choice by Rosen and Willis
(1979), and more recently in the context of occupational choice by Gould (2002). The self-
selection model puts the emphasis on the supply side of the labor market by focusing on the
heterogeneity of individuals. Individuals are endowed with diﬀerent abilities and choose a
sector among a small number of sectors. The demand for workers and wage rates by sectors
are exogenous to the model, as opposed to the general equilibrium model developed in this
paper. An interesting feature of Roy’s model is that it can be used to model endogenous human
capital formation by accounting for individuals’ educational choice.8 Individuals choose their
educational profile based on their initial abilities and the exogenous market wages associated
with each educational background.9 However, used in the context of educational choice, the
model does not spell out tasks or machines and therefore does not allow the distinction between
human factors and technical factors in rising wage inequality.
Also related to the model is Rosen’s (1978) tasks assignment model. Rosen’s (1978) tasks
assignment model puts the emphasis on the demand side of the labor market by focusing on
the heterogeneity of tasks. Tasks diﬀer from one another by the levels of the various types of
skills they require. Workers are grouped in a small number of homogeneous skill groups (edu-
cational categories) and the supply of workers and wage rates by skill groups are assumed to be
exogenous. The main advantage of this model is that it oﬀers a very convenient framework to
analyze substitution between skill groups of workers. Rosen (1978) considers the demand for
labor by modeling firms’ indirect production function resulting from the assignment of tasks
to workers that maximizes output, given exogenous wages. However, human capital formation
and workers heterogeneity within educational groups are not accounted for in Rosen’s (1978)
model. Moreover, labor is the only input and capital plays no role in production.10 This makes
the model less suited for studying the eﬀect of technical change on the distribution of wages.
8See Willis and Rosen (1979) .
9Note that Heckman et al. (1998) have recently extended Roy’s model to allow for investment and endoge-
nous skills prices determination. However, jobs remain absent in their model.
10Dupuy (2006) extends Rosen’s model to the case where 1), within skill groups, workers are heterogenous
and 2) workers rent machines of diﬀerent productive characteristics to produce output. The assignment
problem is solved using Ricardo’s diﬀerential rents principle.
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Most closely related to the approach of this paper are the general hedonic models developed
by Rosen (1974) and Lucas (1977) and in particular Sattinger (1975, 1979 and 1993), Teulings
(1995a, 1995b and 2005), Costrell and Loury (2004) and Terviö (2007). In these models, wage
diﬀerentials across individuals arise because of skills diﬀerentials.11 These skills diﬀerentials are
further amplified through assignment as abler workers are mapped to more productive tasks
in equilibrium. These models are potentially valuable to explain the source of the recent rise
in wage inequality. The general equilibrium structure of these models enables us to separate
the contribution of changes in the distribution of skills in the rise of wage inequality from
the contribution of technological change either in terms of increased productivity or changes
in the distribution of jobs.12 Moreover, by their very nature, they allow us to make the
distinction between technological changes due to human factors or technical factors. However,
these models are silent with respect to the overlap of the wage distribution of college and high-
school graduates and the diﬀerential timing of the between and within rise in wage inequality
since skills are unidimensional and exogenous. The model proposed in this paper contributes to
the literature along those two points. First, the model acknowledges the multidimensionality
of skills which yields two wage functions in equilibrium, one per type of skills, and therefore
enables us to reproduce the overlapping wage distribution of college and high-school graduates.
Second, human capital formation is endogenized by considering workers’ educational self-
selection.
3 A tasks assignment model with endogenous human
capital formation and multidimensional skills
3.1 Supply of skills
Workers’ endowed abilities and skills formation
Suppose workers are endowed with initial abilities vector ab = hab1, ab2i ∈ R2+ where ab1
11Tinbergen’s (1956) allocation model also considers the mapping of heterogenous workers to heterogenous
jobs but wage diﬀerentials arise as compensating diﬀerentials.
12Costrell and Loury (2004) normalize the tasks distribution to be uniform. In a single economy, this
normalization is without loss of generality. However, when one is interested in comparing economies (over
time or across countries) this normalization does not allow to identify separetely the eﬀects of changes in
productivity on assignment and wages from changes in the distribution of tasks.
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and ab2 represent an individual’s ability of type 1 and 2, manual and intellectual ability for the
sake of the argument. Define ξ(ab1, ab2) the density13 of workers whose abilities are ab1 and
ab2. After compulsory education, workers make an educational choice: for instance, whether
to go to college or quit after high-school or whether to study economics or mathematics. The
educational system transforms the vector of initial abilities into a vector of skills through an
educational production function14 Ek, k = 1, 2.
Note that ability endowments vector ab captures abilities at the time individuals make their
educational choice. Hence, ab measures abilities at the end of compulsory education. The
exact definition of abilities therefore encompasses pure ability endowment individuals were
born with and the contribution of factors aﬀecting a child’s ability vector up until the end of
compulsory education. As noted earlier in the literature, families with higher resources, better
educated parents and other favorable environment variables aﬀect a child’s ability (cognitive
and noncognitive). Regarding cognitive abilities, Heckman (1995) and Heckman et al. (2006)
show evidence that these abilities (IQ tests score) are set early in life and seems to be fairly set
by the age 8. In contrast, noncognitive abilities are more malleable and seem to be so until the
late adolescent years as argued by Heckman (2000) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003). This
means that although ab1 and ab2 are fairly influenced by family background and environment
variables, they are fairly set at the end of compulsory education.
The production of skills depends on educational choice. A worker with initial abilities
hab1, ab2i will have skills ht1, t2i = E1(ab) = he11(ab1); e12(ab2)i with e11(ab1) > ab1 and
e12(ab2) ≥ ab2, if she selects education 1 and skills ht01, t02i = E2(ab) = he21(ab1); e22(ab2)i with
e21(ab1) ≥ ab1 and e22(ab2) > ab2, if she selects education 2. In general, this educational
system has an heterogenous treatment eﬀect in the sense that it enhances abilities by factors
specific to each individual’s abilities, i.e. e
00
kj > 0 for hk, ji = 1, 2.15 Moreover, the educational
system transforms initial abilities into skills in a non proportional way. A worker with initial
abilities hab1, ab2i will have skills ht1, t2i with t1/t2 = e11(ab1)/e12(ab2) ≥ ab1/ab2 if she selects
education 1 and skills with t01/t
0
2 = e21(ab1)/e22(ab2) ≤ ab1/ab2 if she selects education 2.
13The economy considered is suﬃciently large so that the distributions of individuals and tasks can be
described by continuous density functions.
14Hartog (2001) uses a similar approach to define the role of education in producing skills. However, Hartog
uses linear transformation of abilities into skills, assumption I do not impose in the model.
15In the special case of a linear transformation of abilities into skills as assumed by Hartog (2001), the
educational system has a common treatment eﬀect: tk = ekk(abk) = ckkabk if education k is chosen or
tk = cjkabk if education j is chosen with e
00
jk = 0 ∀j, k.
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In order for educational choice to be non trivial, I further assume that education k develops
abilities of type k relatively more than education j.
Assumption A1:
i) e0jj > 0 for all j and e
0
jk ≥ 0 for j 6= k, k = 1, 2,
ii) ejj(abj)/ejk(abk) ≥ abj/abk for all j, k = 1, 2,
iii) ekk(abk) > ejk(abk) for all j, k,
iv) ekj(0) = 0 for all j, k.
Without assumption A1 iii), for instance with ejj(abj) > ejk(abk) > ekk(abk) > ekj(abj) ≥
1, educational choice would still be endogenous but education j would be a strictly dominant
educational strategy so that all workers would select education j. Workers with relatively low
ability of type k still seek to enhance their ability of type j through education j only now
workers with relatively high ability of type k choose education j to enhance their ability of
type k. Clearly, although human capital is still endogenous this case is less interesting.
It is important to bear in mind that changes in the educational system that lead to rela-
tive improvements in the production of skills of one type will play a non neutral role in the
educational choice of workers. Indeed, given the distribution of initial abilities and relative
wages, i.e. w1(t1)
w2(t2)
where wk(tk) is the wage of workers supplying tk units of skills of type k and
w0k > 0, an increase in ekk will increase the potential skills of type k compared to the poten-
tial skill of type j of every workers and lead more workers to select education k. The model
therefore allows to investigate the eﬀects of exogenous changes in the educational production
of skills on educational choices and hence wage distribution. For instance, the model could
be used to evaluate the general equilibrium impact of the recent introduction of the “Literacy
Hour” in primary English schools (see Machin and McNally (2005)) or Singapore’s mathemat-
ics teaching method in the USA −launched in order to oﬀset the relative poor numeracy score
of American pupils−16 on wage inequality.
Foresight
16In the distribution of students’ achievements in mathematics at the age of 13 years old across countries
the USA rank 19th out of 38 countries whereas Singapore ranks first. See TIMSS (2000).
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Individuals can choose between various education (no education being one of them) in order
to transform their endowed abilities into productive skills so as to maximize their expected
future earnings. Prior to this educational choice, individuals evaluate the streams of expected
earnings associated to each educational possibility. Since future wages are unobserved this
complicates the assignment problem considerably. Most authors, see Friedman and Kutznets
(1945), Mincer (1974 and 1993), Willis and Rosen (1979) and Heckman et al. (1998) for
instance, have assumed that workers have perfect foresight. With perfect foresight, workers
anticipate every shocks taking place in the future and therefore never make forecasting errors.
This assumption simplifies considerably the model as it leads to strict specialization of workers.
Workers who selected education k supply skills of type k as I will show below.
In contrast, imperfect information in the form of limited foresight17 opens up new assign-
ment possibilities as labor market shocks might be unexpected. For instance, think of a worker
whose manual ability is as large as her intellectual ability, i.e. ab = hab1; ab2i = h10; 10i. Sup-
pose this worker can select a manual degree and end up with t = E1(ab) = h11; 10i or select
a cognitive degree and end up with t = E2(ab) = h10; 11i. Furthermore, this worker expects
to earn $10 per unit of manual skills supplied and expects to earn $12 per unit of intellectual
skills supplied. Following her comparative advantage, this worker will select a cognitive degree
to maximize her expected earnings. Suppose that at the time this worker graduates and enters
the labor market, an unexpected shock occurs so that the pay-rate is $12 per units of manual
skills supplied and $10 per unit of intellectual skills supplied. This worker’s earnings will be
maximized by supplying her manual skills full-time rather than her intellectual skills for which
she studied (relative manual wage is 1.2 > 1.1 relative manual skills).
Hence, with limited foresight, some workers will not supply the skills they developed most
during education, but rather supply their alternative skills. Obviously, this result holds as
long as the diﬀerence between expected wages and actual wages is large enough to compensate
relative skills diﬀerential ex post tk/tj = ekk(abk)/ekj(abj). Hence, if education increases one
type of skills much more than the other type, few workers will be in a situation where supplying
their alternative skills generates more earnings than supplying the skills they developed most
during education. This means that the more unequally education enhances skills of the various
types, the less restrictive the assumption of perfect foresight.
17See Siow (1984) for a comprehensive treatment of occupational choice under uncertainty.
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The limited foresight world deserves particular attention.18 In this paper however, we follow
the mainstream of the literature, e.g. Willis and Rosen (1979) and assume that individuals
have perfect foresight so that expected earnings are by definition equal to actual earnings.
Educational choice
Workers select their education to maximize earnings. Assume that workers can only use
one type of skills at a time so that workers with skills ht1, t2i can supply t1 units of skills of
type 1 for a share τ of their working time and supply t2 units of skills of type 2 the rest of their
working time.19 Workers’ earnings are therefore equal to τw1(t1) + (1− τ)w2(t2) and depend
on educational choice since skills tj = ekj(abj) if education k is chosen and tj = ejj(abj) if
education j is chosen.20
Earnings maximization resumes to:
max
⎡
⎣ maxτ (τw1(e11(ab1)) + (1− τ )w2(e12(ab2))) ;
maxτ (τw1(e21(ab1)) + (1− τ )w2(e22(ab2)))
⎤
⎦
Conditional on their educational choice workers will maximize earnings by specializing and
supplying full time their skills of type 1 or their skills of type 2 according to w1(t1) ≷ w2(t2).
This means that earnings maximization is equivalent tomax [w1(e11(ab1));w2(e12(ab2));w1(e21(ab1));w2(
Result R1:21
Wage functions are monotonic, w0k(tk) > 0 for all k.
18Note that some form of imperfect information in assignment models is treated in MacDonald (1982).
MacDonald extends the comparative advantage model to labor markets with incomplete information about
the types of workers.
19In Lazear’s (2005) terminology, this means that my workers are assumed to be specialists, Lazear’s entre-
preneurs are excluded from the model. Note that in empirical work on wage inequality, the self-employed are
usually excluded from the sample.
20Study costs could be explicitly accounted for in this model by assuming that during her study, a worker
would receive a loan from the firm to a total of Costsk. The worker will pay back this loan once working
by seeing the firm punctions her wage as follows wk(tk) = w∗k(tk) − Costsk, where w∗k(tk) is the marginal
productivity of this worker.
21It will be shown that an eﬃcient assignment of workers to tasks, one that maximizes aggregate output,
leads to monotonic increasing wage functions if within each educational group, the productivity of more skilled
workers increases with the complexity of tasks (as stated below in assumption A2). The monotonicity of the
wage functions is therefore a result of the eﬃcient tasks assignment and not an assumption.
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Given assumption A1 and result R1, we have wk(ekk(abk)) > wk(ejk(abk)) for all j 6= k, so
that the maximization problem simplifies further to:
max [w1(e11(ab1));w2(e22(ab2))] (1)
Using Wj(.) ≡ wj(ejj(.)) for notational simplicity, equation 1 implies that workers with
abilities ab = hab1, ab2i so that Wk(abk) > Wj(abj) follow their comparative advantage and
select education k. Moreover, workers with education k will never supply their skills of type
j under the assumption of perfect foresight.
Let ab∗j(abk) ≡ W−1j (Wk(abk)).22 Workers whose ability abj exceeds ab∗j optimally select
education j and workers with comparative advantage less than ab∗j select education k. Note
that ab∗j is a strictly increasing function of abk under result R1 and assumption A1 i).
23 How-
ever, it could be concave, linear, convex or even locally concave and locally convex depending
on the structural parameters, in contrast to Willis and Rosen’s (1979) application of Roy’s
model in which t∗j is a linear function of tk.
24
Figure 2 depicts the educational self-selection. The 95% contour of the bivariate distribu-
tion ξ(ab1, ab2) is drawn assuming a positive correlation between abilities although the model
does not require this assumption. The marginal distribution of each ability is drawn on the
respective axis. Although educational self-selection is simply defined by the slant ab∗1, un-
derstanding the assignment of tasks to workers later on requires to take a closer look at the
graph. In particular, define groups of workers with the same level of ability of type 1 as a
family. Formally, a worker is said to belong to family x if and only if her ability of type
1 is equal to abx1 . The size of each family is given by the marginal density distribution of
ability 1. There is a infinite number of families and in Figure 2 I concentrate on families α,
β and γ, with abα1 > ab
β
1 > ab
γ
1 . Within families, workers have the same level type 1 ability
22Given result R1, wj(.) are invertible. Moreover, given assumption A1 i), ejj(.) are invertible. Therefore,
Wj(.) are invertible.
23Since ejj(.) and wj(.) are strictly increasing so are Wj(.) and W−1j (.). Hence the function W−1j (Wk(.)) is
strictly increasing.
24In a single cross-section, the nonlinearity of relative wages does not matter since one could simply change
the scales of both abilities so as to obtain a linear functional form. However, when one compares several
economies, one must hold the scale of abilities constant across economies. Hence, by allowing the relative
wage function to be concave, convex or linear, the model oﬀers more flexibility than Willis and Rosen’s linear
specification.
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but diﬀer in their level of type 2 ability. Without loss of generality, I rank, within families,
workers by increasing ability of type 2, abα12 < ..ab
αkα
2 .. < ab
αNα
2 , ab
β1
2 < ..ab
βkβ
2 .. < ab
βNβ
2
and abγ12 < ..ab
γkγ
2 .. < ab
γNγ
2 , so that worker xkx is indiﬀerent between supplying either of her
abilities, i.e. abxkx1 = ab
∗
1(ab
xkx
2 ) and xNx is the size of each family. Hence, in equilibrium, only
those workers with ability abx1 > ab
∗
1(ab
x
2) will supply their ability of type 1 so that the supply
of workers with ability abx1 is a truncation of the marginal density at ab
x
1 . Note that while
those workers from family x that select education 1, supply the same level of ability abx1 , those
that select education 2 supply diﬀerent levels of ability of type 2, i.e. abxkx2 , ..., ab
xNx
2 . Hence,
while workers from family x selecting education 1 will all be assigned to the same task and
earn equal wages, workers from family x that select education 2 will be assigned to diﬀerent
tasks corresponding to their respective levels of ability 2 and earn diﬀerent wages.
Formally, the density of workers supplying abk is obtained by summing up all workers with
abj < ab
∗
j(abk) for j 6= k. The density of workers supplying level abk of type k ability, say
sk(abk) is therefore defined parametrically by:
s1 (ab1) = ξ1 (ab1) =
Z ab∗2(ab1)
0
ξ(ab1, ab2) · dab2 (2)
s2(ab2) = ξ2 (ab2) =
Z ab∗1(ab2)
0
ξ(ab1, ab2) · dab1 (3)
where ab∗1 = W
−1
1 (W2(ab2)) and ab
∗
2 = W
−1
2 (W1(ab1)) withW
−1
1 (W2(0)) = W
−1
2 (W1(0)) = 0.
Note that the density of workers supplying ability abk depends on the wage functions
Wj(abj), j = 1, 2, through ab∗j(abk).
Finally, the supply of workers by education is given by:
S1 =
Z ∞
0
s1 (ab1) dab1 (4)
S2 =
Z ∞
0
s2 (ab2) dab2 = 1− S1 (5)
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3.2 Demand for skills
Consider an economy producing a composite commodity by means of the input of diﬀerent
tasks. Each task is associated with a unit of capital, a machine for the sake of the argument,
and the various tasks correspond to machines with diﬀerent characteristics.25 To produce
output, each machine needs to be operated by a fixed proportion of workers, i.e. one and only
one worker. The owner of a machine is loosely referred to as a firm. In this economy, output Y
is obtained by summing up the production in each single task v from the continuum v ∈ (0, 1).
The distribution of tasks is exogenous and given by the density distribution of tasks d(v) and
cumulative distribution F (v∗) =
R v∗
0
d(v)dv. Assume further that there are as many machines
as workers, i.e. the mass of workers and machines are the same.26 Moreover, the economy is
perfectly competitive so that no worker and no firm can aﬀect the wage and rental rates.
Machine v can be operated by workers with diﬀerent types and levels of skills. However,
workers of diﬀerent types and levels of skills diﬀer in their productivity. Workers supplying
tk units of skills of type k can produce pk(v, tk) units of output when assigned to machine v.
Without loss of generality, I assume that workers supplying skills of type 1 have a comparative
advantage in tasks v close to 0 and workers supplying skills of type 2 have a comparative
advantage in tasks v close to 1 −to fix ideas, if ability of type 1 is manual ability and ability
of type 2 is intellectual ability, then tasks close to 0 are for instance the tasks of a carpentrer
and tasks close to 1 are the tasks of a rocket scientist. Similarily, machines close to 0 could be
circular saws and machines close to 1 could be computers. Tasks in the middle of the support
are the “anybody can do it as eﬃciently” tasks−. I assume further that productivity increases
with the level of skills supplied. Moreover, I assume that type 1 skills and machines close to
0 and skills of type 2 and machines close to 1 are complementary. In other words, among
workers supplying skills of type 1, those with higher t1 skills are more productive in tasks v
close to 0 and among workers supplying skills of type 2, those workers with higher t2 skills
are more productive in tasks v close to 1. Finally, workers supplying skill level 0 (the lowest
possible skills of each type) are equally productive indiﬀerently of the type of skills and the
task to which they are assigned. These assumptions are summarized in Assumption A2.
25This part of the model is to a large extent similar to the diﬀerential rents models described in Sattinger
(1979 and 1993). The terminology “task” and “machine” are interchangeable throughout the paper. In general
I will use “task” for the sake of simplicity but when needed I will refer explicitly to machines.
26Without this assumption, the least productive machines or the least productive workers will inevitably
remained unemployed in equilibrium.
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Assumption A2:
i) Comparative advantage of skills types, i.e.∂p1(v,t1)
∂v
< 0 and, ∂p2(v,t2)
∂v
> 0 ∀v, tk,
ii) absolute advantage of skilled workers, ∂pk(v,tk)
∂tk
> 0 ∀v, tk,
iii) complementarity of skills types and machines, ∂
2p1(v,t1)
∂t1∂v
≤ 0 and, ∂
2p2(v,t2)
∂t2∂v
≥ 0 ∀v, tk,
iv) pk(v, 0) = p ≥ 0 for all k.
3.3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of 1) two wage functionsWk(abk) which indicate a worker’s
earnings associated to the level and type of ability this worker supplies and a rent function
r(v) which indicates the rents associated with a machine of type v, 2) an index function
ab∗k(abj) = W
−1
k (Wj(abj)) that assigns workers to education, 3) a marginal task ε that indicates
the set of tasks assigned to workers of each type and 4) two mapping functions Vk(abk) which
indicate the type of machine assigned to workers of each type and level of ability such that
i) workers maximize earnings and firms maximize rents and ii) both the labor and capital
markets clear.
Following Sattinger (1979 and 1993), the general equilibrium of this model is derived in
three steps once we assume that, in the period under consideration, the density distribution
of tasks does not depend on wages. In the first step, we make a tentative assumption about
the assignment of workers to tasks in equilibrium. The second step consists to derive the
associated equilibrium wages for this assignment. Finally, in the third step, we check whether
the second order conditions for equilibrium, i.e. profits and earnings are concave, are satisfied
under the tentative assignment defined in step 1.
Step 1: Tentative tasks assignment
Given assumption A2 i), an eﬃcient assignment of workers to tasks will maximize output
by assigning workers supplying skills of type 1 to tasks (0, ε) and workers supplying skills of
type 2 to tasks (ε, 1) where ε is the marginal task in equilibrium.27 Given assumption A2 ii)
and iii), among workers supplying skills of type 1, those with the highest level of skill 1 will be
27Firms owing machine ε are indiﬀerent between employing a worker with type 1 or type 2.
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assigned to task 0 and so on until the marginal task ε is assigned to those workers supplying
the lowest level of skill 1. By symmetry, the tasks (ε, 1) are assigned to workers supplying
skills of type 2. Workers supplying the lowest level of skills of type 2 are assigned to task ε
and so on until those workers with the highest level of skills 2 are assigned to task 1.
This eﬃcient tasks assignment results in a mapping function v1 that associates a single
value of ability ab1 to each task v ∈ (0, ε), i.e. v = V1(ab1) with V 01(ab1) < 0, ε = V1(0) and
limab1→∞ V1(ab1) = 0, and a mapping function v2 that associates a single value of ability ab2 to
each task v ∈ (ε, 1), i.e. v = V2(ab2) with V 02(ab2) > 0, ε = V2(0) and limab2→∞ V2(ab2) = 1.28
The marginal task is derived so that aggregate output in the economy is maximized. Since
aggregate output is the sum of the product of each task,29 i.e. Y (ε) =
R ε
0
p1(v, V
−1
1 (v))d(v)dv+R 1
ε
p2(v, V
−1
2 (v))d(v)dv, the marginal task satisfies
∂Y (ε)
∂ε
= 0. Using Leibniz’s formula, this
reads as:
p1(ε, V
−1
1 (ε))d(ε) +
Z ε
0
∂V −11 (v)
∂ε
∂p1(v, V
−1
1 (v))
∂ab1
d(v)dv
= p2(ε, V
−1
2 (ε))d(ε)−
Z 1
ε
∂V −12 (v)
∂ε
∂p2(v, V
−1
2 (v))
∂ab2
d(v)dv
This tasks assignment can be traced in Figure 2. For each family x, workers x1, ..., xkx−1,
those with ability of type 2 lower than abxkx2 , are assigned to task V1(ab
x
1) ∈ (0, ε), whereas
workers xkx, ..., xNx, those with ability of type 2 larger than ab
xkx
2 are assigned respectively to
tasks V2(ab
xkx
2 ), ..., V2(ab
xNx
2 ) with ε ≤ V2(ab
xkx
2 ) < ... < V2(ab
xNx
2 ) ≤ 1.
Figure 3 shows this assignment of workers to tasks in the task-productivity space. The
density distribution of tasks d(v) is drawn below the horizontal axis. Assumption A2 i)
implies that the productivity of workers supplying ability of type 1 (respectively 2) decreases
(increases) as we move to the right of the support of tasks. Assumption A2 ii) implies that
holding the task and the type of ability constant, productivity increases with the level of
ability. Therefore, workers of family α supplying their ability of type 1 are more productive
28Note that Vj(abj) ≡ vj(ejj(abj)) where v01 < 0 and v02 > 0. Functions vi, i = 1, 2 play the same role as the
function h(g) in Sattinger (1975) p. 356, where g is workers’ ability (single scale) and h(g) the diﬃculty (single
scale) of the task performed by workers with ability g in equilibrium and, c(u) in Teulings (1995a, 1995b and
2005) where u is the normalized level of skills and c(u) the associated job complexity in equilibrium.
29Note that so far nothing guarentees that aggregate output will be bounded. Given assumption A2 i)
and ii), a suﬃcient condition for aggregate output to be bounded is that limv−>0 p1(v, v−11 (v))d(v) <∞ and
limv−>1 p2(v, v−12 (v))d(v) <∞.
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in every tasks than workers of family β supplying their ability of type 1 whom are in turns
more productive than workers γ supplying their type 1 ability.
Equilibrium is defined by the marginal task ε. This task is assigned to workers supplying
level of ability 0 indiﬀerently of the type of ability. Moving to the left, we reach first the task
assigned to workers γ1, ..., γkγ−1, then the task of workers β1, ..., βkβ−1 and finally the task of
workers α1, ..., αkα−1. This defines the mapping function V1(ab1). Going back to the marginal
task and moving to the right, we reach successively the task assigned to workers γkγ , βkβ , γNγ ,
αkα , βNβ and finally αNα. This defines the mapping function V2(ab2).
In this tentative equilibrium, the density of workers’ skills is directly derived from the
density of tasks by performing the transformation of variables v = Vk(abk) and noting that
dvk = V
0
k · dabk. This yields:
Z ε=V1(0)
0=V1(∞)
d(v) · V 01(ab1) · dab1 =
Z ∞
0
s1 (ab1) · dab1 (6)Z 1=V2(∞)
ε=V2(0)
d(v) · V 02(ab2) · dab2 =
Z ∞
0
s2 (ab2) · dab2 (7)
where sj (abj) = ξj(abj) =
R ab∗
k
(abj)
0
ξ(abj , abk) · dabk and,
ab∗j(abk) = W
−1
j (Wk(abk)).
Hence, the following result:
Result R2: In equilibrium the density of workers with ability abk is:
sk (abk) = d(Vk(abk)) · V 0k(abk) (8)
Result R2 has important implications for the resolution of the assignment problem. At
first sight, these equations look like independent first order nonlinear nonautonomous diﬀer-
ential equations. In the one dimensional skill case, when both the distribution of skills and
tasks are exogenous, as in Sattinger (1979 and 1993), equation 8 is indeed a first order non-
linear nonautonomous diﬀerential equation that admits closed form solutions when tasks and
skills follow a Pareto or a Normal distribution. However, when the distribution of skills is
endogenous, sj(abj) in equation 8 depends on equilibrium wages through the index function
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ab∗k(abj) = W
−1
k (Wj(abj)). As is shown below, equilibrium wages are derived from the first or-
der condition to profit maximization. This condition stipulates that wage diﬀerentials are set
equal to productivity diﬀerentials. The wage functions are therefore obtained by integrating
the productivity diﬀerentials evaluated at the equilibrium task, i.e. replacing v by Vk(abk),
over abilities of the respective types. This means that each wage function depends not only
on the shape of the production function of worker-task pairs for each type of workers but
also on the associated mapping function. As a result, each sj(abj) is a function of both map-
ping functions. Hence, V1(ab1) and V2(ab2) are solutions of a system of first order nonlinear
nonautonomous diﬀerential equations.
Closed form solutions are unlikely to exist. It should be noted, however, that the role of
mapping functions in assignment models is to bring “flexibility” in an economy with fixed
distribution of workers and tasks. To put it in Tinbergen’s words,
“The supply distribution of skills has to be deformed so as to coincide with the
demand distribution otherwise there will not be equilibrium.” Tinbergen (1956),
p. 162.
The mapping functions deform (stretch) the density distribution of skills so as to make it
fit the distribution of tasks. Allowing the distribution of skills to be endogenous, brings an
additional source of flexibility in the economy. In the most extreme form of endogeneity, the
distribution of skills would mimic perfectly the distribution of tasks and the mapping function
would be identity. This suggests a legitimate solution to circumvent the problem of solving
equation 8 for the mapping functions. Shifting the flexibility from the mapping function to the
skills formation, one could impose the shape of the mapping functions Vk and solve equations
8 for the conditional density of workers with ability abk, k = 1, 2. Of course, since the type
of endogeneity described in the model does certainly not refer to the case where the mapping
functions are identity, the shape of the mapping functions must be flexible enough so that
calibration of the parameters of these functions would reproduce accurately the conditional
distribution of abilities observed in the economy or believed to be reasonably closed to the
true distribution. In section 5, I will discuss a set of assumptions that provides closed form
solutions for the wage and rent functions when the mapping functions have a logistic form.
Step 2: First order conditions
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A firm owing machine v seeks to maximize the profits derived from its machine. The profits
from assigning a worker with education k and with skills tk = ekk(abk) are pk(v, ekk(abk)) −
Wk(abk). The firm will therefore compare the productivity increase to the wage increase
associated to a worker with higher skills tk or equivalently higher ability abk since e0kk > 0 for
all k. This yields the following first order condition:
∂pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂abk
= W 0k(abk) ∀k = 1, 2 (9)
Note that from assumptions A1 i) and A2 ii), we therefore have Result 1, w0k(tk) =
W 0
k
(abk)
e0
kk
(abk)
> 0 ∀k = 1, 2.
The equilibrium rents are obtained in a similar fashion by noting that earnings are given
by Wk(abk) = pk(v, ekk(abk)) − r(v). Earnings maximization leads workers supplying ability
abk to compare the productivity increase to the rent increase associated to a machine ranked
to the left or the right of v. Hence, the first order conditions to earnings maximization are
given by:
∂pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂v
= r0(v) ∀k = 1, 2 (10)
Moreover, firms owing machines ε are indiﬀerent between employing the worker supplying
the lowest level of skills of type 1, t1,ε = e11(0), or the worker supplying the lowest level of
skills of type 2, t2,ε = e22(0). Stated otherwise, the rents of the owners of machines ε are
equal whether worker ab1 = 0 or ab2 = 0 are assigned to machine ε: p1(ε, e11(0)) −W1(0) =
p2(ε, e22(0))−W2(0).
Equation 9 gives the wage diﬀerential at task v and equation 10 gives the rent diﬀerential
at ability abk. These wage and rent diﬀerentials do not hold for values of abk or v other
than abk = V −1k (v) and v = Vk(abk) respectively and therefore depend on the equilibrium
assignment.
Step 3: Second order conditions
The tentative assignment defined in step 1 is a valid one only when the firms’ second
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order condition to profits maximization and workers’ second order conditions to earnings
maximization, that is profits are concave in abk and earnings are concave in v , are satisfied.
Put in equation, the second order condition for profits maximization reads as:
∙
∂2pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂ab2k
¸
v=Vk(abk)
−W ”k (abk) < 0 ∀k = 1, 2
⇔
−
∙
∂2pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂abk∂v
V 0k
¸
v=Vk(abk)
< 0
since W
00
k (abk) =
h
∂2pk(v,ekk(abk))
∂ab2
k
i
v=Vk(abk)
+
h
∂2pk(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk∂v
V 0k(abk)
i
v=Vk(abk)
.
The second order conditions for earnings maximization read as:
∙
∂2pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂v2
¸
abk=V
−1
k
(v)
− r”(v) < 0 ∀k = 1, 2
⇔
−
∙
∂2pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂abk∂v
e0kk(abk)
V 0k
¸
abk=V
−1
k
(v)
< 0
since r
00
(v) =
h
∂2pk(v,ekk(abk))
∂v2
k
i
abk=V
−1
k
(v)
+
h
∂2pk(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk∂v
e0
kk
(abk)
V 0
k
i
abk=V
−1
k
(v)
.
Since e0kk > 0 from assumption A1 i) and V
0
1 < 0 and V
0
2 > 0 these second order conditions
therefore imply that:h
∂2p1(v,e11(ab1))
∂ab1∂v
i
v=V1(ab1)
< 0 and
h
∂2p2(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2∂v
i
v=V2(ab2)
> 0. Hence, as long as e0kk >
0 and the cross derivative ∂
2p1(v,e11(ab1))
∂ab1∂v
is negative and the cross derivative ∂
2p2(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2∂v
is
positive, that is as long as education increases skills (assumption A1 i)) and skills of type 1,
respectively skills of type 2, complement machines close to 0, respectively 1 (assumption A2
iii)), an assignment where within educational groups more skilled workers get more productive
machines, i.e. V 01 < 0 and V
0
2 > 0, is valid.
Equilibrium pricing functions
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Evaluating the diﬀerential equation 9 at v = Vk(abk) and integrating over abk yields the
wage function for workers supplying ability of type k.
Wk(abk) ≡ wk(ekk(abk)) = wk0 +
abkZ
0
∙
∂pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂abk
¸
v=Vk(abk)
dabk (11)
where wk0 is a constant of integration.
Similarly, evaluating the diﬀerential equation 10 at abk = V −1k (v) and integrating over v
yields the rent function as follows:
r(v) = r0 +
vZ
ε
∙
∂pk(v, ekk(abk))
∂v
¸
abk=V
−1
k
(v)
dv (12)
where r0 is a constant of integration.
The wage and rent functions are identified up to constants of integration. Following Sat-
tinger (1979),30 the model is closed by specifying exogenous reserve prices for the marginal
workers and machine. For the least skilled workers in both groups to be indiﬀerent between
being assigned to machine ε or remaining unemployed we need Wk(0) = wk0 = ew > 0
where ew is the reservation wage. Since firms owing machines ε are indiﬀerent between
employing the least skilled worker of each type, it follows from assumption A2 iv) that
r(ε) = r0 = pk(ε, ekk(0)) − ew = p − ew ≥ 0 ∀ε. Hence, for the firms owing machines ε to
be indiﬀerent between supplying the machine to the market or withholding the machine from
the market we need r0 = p− ew = er where er is the reserve price for the owner of capital.
Wage distribution
We have established in Result 1 that, in equilibrium, wages are increasing in abilities.
Moreover, the equilibrium in this economy is characterized by two functions mapping the
ability of each type to tasks. Using this information, the wage density for both types of workers,
30Costrell and Loury (2004) consider a continuum of tasks in a single enterprise, not in the whole economy,
and therefore close the model by a free entry condition that drives profits of each enterprise down to 0.
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say fk(w), is directly derived from the density of tasks by performing the transformation of
variables v = Vk(W−1k (w)) and noting that dv =
dVk
dabk
dabk
dW
dW =
V 0
k
W 0
k
dW . This yields:
Z ∞
hw
fk(W )dW =
1
Sk
Z 0=W−1
k
(ab−1
k
(∞))
ε=W−1
k
(ab−
k
( hw))
d(Vk(W
−1
k (W )))
V 0k
W 0k
dW (13)
where Sk =
R∞
0
d(Vk(W
−1
k (W ))V
0
k(W
−1
k (W )dW is the share of workers supplying ability of
type k in equilibrium and noting that W 0k(abk) =
∂pk(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
.
Hence, the following result:
Result R3: In equilibrium the wage density of workers of type k is:
fk(W ) =
1
Sk
d(Vk(W
−1
k (W )))
V 0k
W 0k
(14)
Results R3 indicates that the wage density within education can be directly retrieved from
the density of tasks, once we solve for the mapping functions Vk. These solutions are derived
from the equilibrium employment condition.
4 Technological change, educational choice and the as-
signment of workers to tasks
The traditional approach to capture technological progress is to consider changes in the pro-
ductivity of worker-task pairs, i.e. changes in pk(., .). These changes in the shape of the
production function of worker-task pairs could take an infinite number of diﬀerent forms. It
seems therefore judicious to focus on particular forms of changes and especially those yielding
changes in educational self-selection and the distribution of wages that are close to changes
observed in the data. The most puzzling finding in the rising wage inequality literature is the
diﬀerential behavior of the between and within wage inequality in the US in the 60s and 70s.
While within education wage inequality rose throughout the 60s and 70s, the between wage
inequality remained fairly constant.
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Using the model depicted above in this context, ab1 could be thought of as manual ability
and ab2 as intellectual ability. Education 1 would then correspond to high-school education
and education 2 to college education. The question arises as can the model depicted above
reproduce a rise in within education wage inequality with constant between wage inequality
and an increase in the supply of college graduates. Hence, can we change pk(v, ekk(abk)) so
that i) S2, the supply of college graduates, increases over time, ii) the ratio of the mean wage
of college graduates to high-school graduates remains constant and iii) fk(w) flattens over time
(increased within wage inequality).
4.1 Intuition
Let focus for the moment on workers educational self-selection and leave the assignment of
tasks hidden in the back of our mind. Consider a simple example that provides a general
intuition of the way formal conditions under which technical change will lead to i), ii) and
iii) in the model can be derived. Instead of a continuum of manual and intellectual ability
levels, consider a simplified version of the model with three levels of each type of ability,
namely high, medium and low. The distribution of abilities is given by the matrix in Table
1. From result R1 of the model, wage rates are increasing in abilities and hence, the following
inequalities must always hold WjL < WjM < WjH for j = 1, 2. Workers select either high-
school education, supply their manual ability and earn the wage rate associated to their level
of ability, i.e. W1J , J = L,M,H or select college education supply their intellectual ability
and earn the associated wage rate W2J J = L,M,H.
The initial equilibrium is depicted in Table 1. Given the wage rates reported in Table 1,
the equilibrium assignment will be as follows. Starting from the bottom left corner of the
matrix, since W 01L =W
0
2L = 1, 8 randomly chosen workers with low levels of both abilities will
choose high-school, supply their manual ability and earn 1 while the remaining 8 workers will
choose college education, supply their intellectual ability and earn 1. It follows from result R1
that the 9 workers with low intellectual ability but medium manual ability and the 8 workers
with low intellectual ability but high manual ability select high-school education, supply their
respective levels of manual ability and earn 2 and 3 respectively. Similarly, from result R1, the
9 workers with low manual ability but medium intellectual ability and the 8 workers with low
manual ability and high intellectual ability select college education, supply their respective
levels of intellectual ability and earn respectively 2 and 3. Since initial wage rates are so
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that W 01M = W
0
2M = 2, 8 randomly chosen workers with medium ability of both types select
high-school education, supply their manual ability and earn 2 while the remaining 8 workers
select college education, supply their intellectual ability and earn 2. From result R1, the
9 workers with medium manual ability but high intellectual ability select college education,
supply their intellectual ability and earn 3. Similarly, from result R1, the 9 workers with
medium intellectual ability but high manual ability select high-school education, supply their
manual ability and earn 3. Finally, since W 01H = W
0
2H = 3, 8 randomly chosen workers with
high abilities of both types select high-school education, supply their manual ability and earn
3 while the remaining 8 workers select college education, supply their intellectual ability and
earn 3.
Denoting LjJ the equilibrium employment of workers with education j and level J of ability
of type j and sjJ the share of workers with education j supplying level J of ability of type
j in equilibrium (i.e. sjJ =
LjJ
Lj.
where Lj. = LjL + LjM + LjH is the supply of workers with
education j), between wage inequality is then given by
S
J s2JW
0
2JS
J s1JW
0
1J
.
Note that this equilibrium assignment will hold as long as W t2L = W
t
1L < W
t
1M = W
t
2M <
W t2H = W
t
1H hold. Changing the values of the various wage rates but respecting these (in-
)equalities would aﬀect the wage distribution but not equilibrium assignment. Hence, technical
change could lead to an increase in W tjM compared to W
t
jL and W
t
jH compared to W
t
jM and
hence an increase in within wage inequality, without aﬀecting the equilibrium assignment. For
instance, consider a technical change that increases W tjM for j = 1, 2 from 2 to 4 and W
t
jH
from 3 to 8, whereasW tjL remains constant over time. This technical change leaves equilibrium
assignment constant, increases the mean wage in both groups from 2.3 to 5.5, leaving therefore
between wage inequality unaﬀected, but increases the variance of wages within education from
0.54 to 7.2.
This type of technical change increases within wage inequality while maintaining between
wage inequality constant but does not impact the equilibrium assignment and hence leaves the
supply of college workers constant over time. To fully characterize the evolution of the labor
market in the US in the 70s however, the supply of workers with college education should
increase. One obvious way to increase the supply of college education while maintaining the
between education wage inequality constant is to add workers with low intellectual ability to
the group of college workers. To induce additional workers with low intellectual ability to
select college education, the associated wage rate must increase compared to the wage rate
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for low manual ability. This new assignment will hold for wage rates so that W 11L < W
1
2L <
W 11M = W
1
2M < W
1
2H = W
1
1H . Two forces of opposite sign impact the mean wage of both
college and high-school graduates, i.e. the price eﬀect and the composition eﬀect. At constant
supply, the relative increase in W2L rises the mean wage of college graduates compared to
high-school graduates and hence between wage inequality goes up. However, the price eﬀect
goes along with a change in the ability composition of both groups of workers. Indeed, since
the additional college graduates have relative low intellectual ability, the share of low ability
workers increases among college workers which decreases the mean wage of college graduates
and compresses between wage inequality. In contrast, since the additional college workers also
have relatively low manual ability, the density of low ability workers decreases among high-
school graduates which increases the mean wage of high-school graduates and hence drives the
between wage inequality upward. For the between wage inequality to remain constant, the
relative increase in the wage rate for low intellectual ability compared to the wage rate for low
manual ability must be large enough to compensate the relative composition eﬀect in the two
groups. Formally, this reads as:
W 12L =
S
J s
0
2JW
0
2JS
J s
0
1JW
0
1J
P
J s
1
1JW
1
1J −
P
J 6=L s
1
2JW
1
2J
s12L
(15)
However, since this equilibrium assignment only holds as long as W t2L < W
t
1M =W
t
2M , the
required increase in W t2L as derived from equation 15 must not be too large. For instance, for
W 11L = 1, W
1
1M = W
1
2M = 4 and W
1
1H = W
1
2H = 8, W
1
2L as derived from equation 15 is equal
to 2.6 > 2.1 = W 11M = W
1
2M . In this case, the relative composition eﬀect in the high-school
group is too large. Stated otherwise, for feasible W 12L, the mean wage of college graduates
will decrease compared to the mean wage of high-school graduates. One way to rebalance
the relative mean wages in this example is to increase the wage rate for high intellectual
ability compared to the wage rate for high manual ability. This will induce workers with high
intellectual ability to select college education. Both the price and the composition eﬀect will
push the mean wage of college graduate up and the mean wage of high-school graduates down.
Given the right magnitude, between wage inequality will return to its initial level. In other
words, we have now two unknowns (W t2L and W
t
2H) so that W
t
1L < W
t
2L < W
t
1M = W
t
2M <
W t1H < W
t
2H , and one equation, hence an infinity of solutions which satisfy the equilibrium
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conditions. For instance, suppose that W 11L = 1, W
1
1M = W
1
2M = 4, W
1
1H = 8 but W
1
2H is
now equal to 9. From equation 15 we have W 12L = 2 which clearly lies between W
1
1L = 1 and
W 11M = 4. This technical change has increased within wage inequality in both groups, from
0.54 to 4.3 and 9.3 respectively for high-school and college workers, maintained between wage
inequality constant and increased the relative supply of college workers from 50% to 66%.
This simplification of the model provides an intuition about the type of technical change
that leads simultaneously to an increase in the supply of college graduates and an increase of
within wage inequality but maintains between wage inequality constant over time. This type
of technical change increases wages associated with low and high intellectual ability compared
to wages associated respectively to low and high manual ability.
4.2 Propositions
Denote pk,t(v, ekk(abk)) the productivity of a worker with ability abk at task v at time t. Since
in assignment models wages are derived from the marginal productivity of workers, it is very
convenient to define technical change in terms of the marginal productivity of workers rather
than in terms of productivity. Let technical change be captured as ∆t
∂pk,t(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
. This is
a general definition that encompasses very diﬀerent forms of technical change. Three families
can be distinguished. The first family of technical change, characterized by ∆t
∂pk,t(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
(χk − 1)
∂pk,t−1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
with χk > 1, increases the marginal productivity of workers propor-
tionally in every tasks and for every workers. The second family of technical change relates to
the technical factor as the marginal productivity of workers increases relatively more in tasks
closed to 0 for workers supplying ability of type 1 and tasks closed to 1 for workers supplying
ability of type 2. This family is characterized by ∆t
∂pk,t(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
= (θk(v)− 1) ∂pk,t−1(v,ekk(abk))∂abk
with θk(v) > 1 and θ
0
1 < 0 and θ
0
2(v) > 0. Think for instance of improvement in the quality
of red rubber tracks in athletics or the capacity of computers. The third family relates to
the human factor as the marginal productivity of workers increases relatively more for more
able workers. This family is characterized by ∆t
∂pk,t(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
= (ϕk(abk)− 1)
∂pk,t−1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
with ϕk(abk) > 1 and ϕ
0
k > 0. Think for instance of the introduction of the Fosbury flop in
high-jump or Bellman’s equation in optimal dynamic programing.
Type 1: Neutral.
Formally, assume that technical change is captured by the parameters χk so that
∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
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χk
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
with χk > 1. Hence, technical change increases the marginal productivity of
workers with manual (intellectual) ability proportionally in every tasks. To derive conditions
under which technical change will lead to i) ii) and iii), I propose to first derive conditions under
which technical change will lead to ii) and iii) but leave equilibrium assignment unchanged.
Proposition 1 If technical change, characterized by χk, is so that χ1 = χ2, then equilib-
rium assignment and between wage inequality remain constant while within wage inequality
increases.
Proof. First, note that a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the equilibrium assignment
to remain constant over time at constant distribution of tasks is for the supply of abilities to
remain constant over time. This condition reads as ab∗1,1(ab2) = ab
∗
1,0(ab2). This is equivalent
to imposing ab∗1,1(0) = ab
∗
1,0(0) and
∂ab∗1,1(ab2)
∂ab2
=
∂ab∗1,0(ab2)
∂ab2
for all ab2 > 0. Since, in equilibrium,
the least skilled workers get the reservation wage independently of their type of ability, as long
as the reservation wage is constant over time we have ab∗1,1(0) = ab
∗
1,0(0). Since ab
∗
1,t(ab2) =
W−11,t (W2,t(ab2)), we have:
∂ab∗1,1(ab2)
∂ab2
=
∂p2,1(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2
∂p1,1(v,e11(ab∗1,t(ab2)))
∂ab1
=
χ2
∂p2,0(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2
χ1
∂p1,0(v,e11(ab1))
∂ab1
It follows that:
∂ab∗1,1(ab2)
∂ab2
=
∂ab∗1,0(ab2)
∂ab2
⇔
χ1 = χ2
Hence, as long as the technical change parameters χ1 and χ2 are equal, the equilibrium
assignment of workers to education and workers to tasks will remain constant over time. This
means that wage inequality between education remains constant. However, the slopes of the
wage functions will increase since ∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
= χk
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
>
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
for all k, v
and abk, and so will wage inequality within education.
To fully characterize the evolution of the labor market in the US in the 70s, the supply
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of workers with college education should increase. Given the type of technical change defined
by χj, the only way to do so is to increase χ2 compared to χ1. Though possible, it is very
unlikely that changes in χ2/χ1 will leave the ratio of the mean wage of college graduates to
high-school graduates constant.
Type 2: Technical factor.
Formally, assume that technical change is captured by the function θk(v) so that
∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
θk(v)
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
with θk(v) > 1 and θ
0
1(v) < 0 and θ
0
2(v) > 0 for all v. Hence, technical
change increases the marginal productivity of workers with manual (intellectual) ability rel-
atively more in tasks close to 0 (respectively 1). To derive conditions under which technical
change will lead to i) ii) and iii), I propose to follow the intuition provided in the previous
section, that is, to first derive conditions under which technical change will lead to ii) and
iii) but leave equilibrium assignment and hence the supply of college graduates unaﬀected
over time and then depart from this condition by allowing technical change to aﬀect the wage
functions so that the additional workers selecting college education have either low or high
intellectual ability compared to the initial college graduates.
Proposition 2 If technical change, characterized by the functions θk(v), is so that V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(.)))) =
W−11,0 (W2,0(.)) with θk(v) > 1 and θ
0
1(v) < 0 and θ
0
2(v) > 0 for all v, then equilibrium assign-
ment and between wage inequality remain constant while within wage inequality increases.
Proof. Once again, for the equilibrium assignment to remain constant, we need supply to
remain constant. Supply will remain constant if and only if:
∂ab∗1,1(ab2)
∂ab2
=
∂p2,1(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2
∂p1,1(v,e11(ab∗1,1(ab2)))
∂ab1
=
θ2(v)
∂p2,0(v,e22(ab2))
∂ab2
θ1(v)
∂p1,0(v,e11(ab1))
∂ab1
It follows that:
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∂ab∗1,1(ab2)
∂ab2
=
∂ab∗1,0(ab2)
∂ab2
⇔
θ1(v1(ab
∗
1,0(ab2))) = θ2(v2(ab2))
⇔
V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(ab2)))) = ab
∗
1,0(ab2)
= W−11,0 (W2,0(ab2))
Hence, as long as the shapes of the technical change functions θk are so that V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(.)))) =
W−11,0 (W2,0(.)) the equilibrium assignment of workers to education and workers to tasks will
remain constant over time. This means that wage inequality between education remains
constant. However, the slopes of the wage functions will increase since ∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
θk(v)
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
>
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
for all k, v and abk. This means that wage inequality
will rise within education.
To fully characterize the evolution of the labor market in the US in the 70s, the supply
of workers with college education should increase. Following the intuition provided in the
previous section, suppose that technical change is so that:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(ab2)))) < W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for 0 < ab2 < ab
−
2
V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(ab2)))) =W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for ab
−
2 ≤ ab2 ≤ ab+2
V −11 (θ
−1
1 (θ2(V2(ab2.)))) > W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for ab2 > ab
+
2
Hence, this technical change leads workers with intellectual ability ab2 < ab−2 or ab2 > ab
+
2
and manual ability so that ab∗1,0(ab2) < ab1 < ab
∗
1,1(ab2) to switch from high-school to college
education.
Type 3: Human factor.
Formally, assume that technical change is defined by the function ϕk(abk) so that
∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
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ϕk(abk)
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
with ϕk(abk) > 1 and ϕ
0
k(abk) > 0 for all k and abk. Proposition 2 indi-
cates a suﬃcient condition for this type of technical change to generate rising wage inequality
within education and constant wage inequality between education leaving equilibrium assign-
ment unaﬀected and hence the supply of college graduates constant over time.
Proposition 3 If technical change, characterized by the functions ϕk(abk), is so that ϕ
−1
1 (ϕ2(.)) =
W−11,0 (W2,0(.)) with ϕk(abk) > 1 and ϕ
0
k(abk) > 0 for all k and abk, then equilibrium assignment
and between wage inequality remain constant and within wage inequality increases.
Proof. Once again, for the equilibrium assignment to remain constant, we need supply to
remain constant. Supply will remain constant if and only if:
ϕ2(ab2) = ϕ1(ab
∗
1,0(ab2))
⇔
ϕ−11 (ϕ2(ab2)) = ab
∗
1,0(ab2)
= W−11,0 (W2,0(ab2))
Hence, as long as the shapes of the technical change functions ϕk are so that ϕ
−1
1 (ϕ2(.)) =
W−11,0 (W2,0(.)) the equilibrium assignment of workers to education and workers to tasks will
remain constant over time. This means that wage inequality between education remains
constant. However, the slopes of the wage functions will increase since ∂pk,1(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
=
ϕk(abk)
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
>
∂pk,0(v,ekk(abk))
∂abk
for all k, v and abk, and so will wage inequality within
education.
Similarly to the previous type of technical change, suppose that technical change is so that:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ϕ−11 (ϕ2(ab2)) < W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for 0 < ab2 < ab
−
2
ϕ−11 (ϕ2(ab2)) = W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for ab
−
2 ≤ ab2 ≤ ab+2
ϕ−11 (ϕ2(ab2)) > W
−1
1,0 (W2,0(ab2)) for ab2 > ab
+
2
Hence, this technical change leads workers with intellectual ability ab2 < ab−2 or ab2 > ab
+
2
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and manual ability so that ab∗1,0(ab2) < ab1 < ab
∗
1,1(ab2) to switch from high-school to college
education.
It is important to note that the function ϕk could capture changes in the educational
system that lead to relative improvements in the production of skills of one type compared to
the other. Indeed, suppose for instance that pk(v, ekk(abk)) is multiplicatively separable, i.e.
pk(v, ekk(abk)) = fk(v)gk(ekk(abk)) with f 01 < 0, f
0
2 > 0 and g
0
k > 0. The marginal productivity
of workers at time t then reads as:
∂pk,t(v, ekk(abk))
∂abk
= fk,t(v)e
0
kk,t(abk)g
0
k,t(ekk,t(abk))
Assuming that fk,t and gk,t are constant over time, we now have:
ϕk(abk) =
e0kk,1(abk)g
0
k,0(ekk,1(abk))
e0kk,0(abk)g
0
k,0(ekk,0(abk))
Hence, the human factor could come about because workers find more eﬃcient ways to
use their machines over time or because, at given abilities, skills have increased through
improvements of the human capital formation. Without proper empirical setting, there are
no way one could distinguish between the two sources of human factor.
5 Closed form solutions
5.1 Tasks distribution
Assume that the density function of tasks is given by d(v|d1, d2) = Avd1(1− v)d2 with dj > 0
and A = 1/B(d1 + 1, d2 + 1) and B(.) is the Beta function and cumulative distribution
F (v∗|d1, d2) = Pr (v < v∗) =
R v∗
0
d(v|d1, d2)dv. The mean task is given by E[v] = d1+12+d1+d2
(E[v] = 1
2
when d1 = d2) and the variance by V ar[v] =
(d1+1)(d2+1)
(2+d1+d2)(3+d1+d2)
, with ∂V ar[v]
∂dk
< 0.
Moreover, the distribution is skewed toward 0 when d1 > d2 and vice versa.
The Beta distribution is appealing because its support ranges from 0 to 1, it has only
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two parameters, and its shape is extremely flexible. If d1 > 0 and d2 > 0 the distribution
is unimodal. If d1 = d2 = d and d = 0 tasks are uniformly distributed. Moreover, for
d > 1 the Beta distribution and the normal distribution with average 1
2
and variance equal to
(d1+1)(d2+1)
(2+d1+d2)(3+d1+d2)
look alike.
Given this specification we have in equilibrium:
sk (abk) = Avk(abk)
d1(1− vk(abk))d2 · v0k(abk)
5.2 The mapping functions
Assume that the mapping functions have a logistic form, with limabk→∞ V
0
k(abk) = 0, k = 1, 2
since limabk→∞ Vk(abk) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if k = 2
0 if k = 1
. That is, let V1 and V2 be as follows:
V1(ab1) =
ε
1 + abr11
(16)
V2(ab2) = 1−
1− ε
1 + abr22
with ab∗j(0) =W
−1
j (Wk(0)) and rk > 0. Note that V
0
1 = −
εr1ab
r1−1
1
(1+abr11 )
2 < 0 and V 02 =
(1−ε)r2abr2−12
(1+ab
r2
2 )
2 >
0.
The advantage of the logistic specification in equation 16 is that it allows for very flexible
mapping functions that each depends on a single parameter rk. The larger rk, the more
pronounce the S − shape of the mapping function, that is the faster V1 tends to 0 when ab1
tends to infinity and the faster V1 tends to ε when ab1 tends 0, and the faster V2 tends to 1
when ab2 tends to infinity and the faster V2 tends to ε when ab2 tends 0.
Replacing Vk(abk) by their expression in the employment equilibrium condition obtains:
s1 (ab1) = A
µ
ε
1 + abr11
¶d1 µ
1− ε
1 + abr11
¶d2 εr1abr1−11
(1 + abr11 )
2 (17)
s2 (ab2) = A
µ
1− 1− ε
1 + abr22
¶d1 µ 1− ε
1 + abr22
¶d2 (1− ε)r2abr2−12
(1 + abr22 )
2
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Equation 17 indicates that using data on workers containing information about their ability
ab1 and ab2, conditional on the marginal task ε and the distribution of tasks, d1 and d2, we
could calibrate rk so that the right hand side is as close as possible to nonparametric estimation
of the left hand side.
5.3 The production of skills and the product of worker-task pairs
Let skills production be multiplicative in abilities so that ekk(abk) = ekabk, with ek > 0 for
all k to satisfy assumption A1. Let the product of a worker-machine pair be Cobb-Douglas so
that p1(v, e11(ab1)) = p+ p1 × (e1ab1)m1
¡
1
v
¢n1 and p2(v, e22(ab2)) = p+ p2 × (e2ab2)m2 ( 11−v )n2
with p = er + ew, pk > 0, mk > 0 and nk > 0. Note that these shapes satisfy assumptions A2.
The first order conditions in equation 9 then simplify to:
p1m1e
m1
1 ab
m1−1
1
µ
1
v
¶n1
= e1w
0
1(e1ab1)
and
p2m2e
m2
2 ab
m2−1
2
µ
1
1− v
¶n2
= e2w
0
2(e2ab2)
Aggregate output is then given by:
Y (ε) =
Z ε
0
p1(v, v
−1
1 (v))d(v)dv +
Z 1
ε
p2(v, v
−1
2 (v))d(v)dv
= p+A
⎛
⎝
R ε
0
p1e
m1
1 (ε− v)
m1/r1 v
d1−n1−m1r1 (1− v)d2dv
+
R 1
ε
p2e
m2
2 (v − ε)
m2/r2 vd1(1− v)d2−n2−
m2
r2 dv
⎞
⎠
Aggregate output will be bounded if and only if:
lim
v→0
p1e
m1
1 (ε− v)
m1/r1 v
d1−n1−m1r1 (1− v)d2 < ∞
lim
v→1
p2e
m2
2 (v − ε)
m2/r2 vd1(1− v)d2−n2−
m2
r2 < ∞
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Hence, for aggregate output to be bounded we need to impose dj −nj − mjrj ≥ 0. Since nj,
mj and rj are all positive, we have that dj ≥ nj + mjrj > 0 and therefore the model is limited
to the case of unimodal distribution of tasks.
And, the marginal task is solution to the equality:
p1m1e
m1
1
r1
Z ε
0
(ε− v)
m1−r1
r1 v
d1−n1−m1r1 (1− v)d2dv
=
p2m2e
m2
2
r2
Z 1
ε
(v − ε)
m2−r2
r2 vd1(1− v)d2−n2−
m2
r2 dv
Unfortunately, general closed form solution for the marginal task do not exist. Close form
solutions for the wage function will therefore be conditional on the (numerical) solution for
the marginal task.
5.4 Equilibrium wages
Given these specifications, equilibrium wages have the following functional form:
w1(e1ab1) = ew + p1em11 µ1ε
¶n1 Z
m1ab
m1−1
1 (1 + ab
r1
1 )
n1 dab1
w2(e2ab2) = ew + p2em22 µ 11− ε
¶n2 Z
m2ab
m2−1
2 (1 + ab
r2
2 )
n2 dab2
Although no general analytical solutions exist for real parameters values of nk and numeri-
cal approximation techniques should be used, a family of analytical solutions exists for integer
values. Indeed, for integer values of nk all we need is to find a solution to integrals of the typeR
mxm−1 (1 + xr)n dx. For n = 1, the solution is straightforward, xm
¡
1 + m
m+r
xr
¢
. For n ≥ 2,
these integrals can be solved by successively integrating by parts. Integrating by part once we
obtain:
Z
mxm−1 (1 + xr)n dx = xm (1 + xr)n − nr
Z
xm+r−1 (1 + xr)n−1 dx
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For n = 2, the integral in the right hand side of the equation has a simple solution,
xm+r( 1
m+r
+ 1
m+2r
xr). If n > 2, this integral can be integrated by parts.
Z
xm+r−1 (1 + xr)n−1 dx
=
1
m+ 1
µ
xm+r(1 + xr)n−1 − (n− 1)r
Z
xm+2r−1 (1 + xr)n−2 dx
¶
Once again, if n = 3, the integral in the right hand side of the equation has a simple
solution, xm+2r( 1
m+2r
+ 1
m+3r
xr). If n > 3, the integral can be once again integrated by
parts. Since the parameter nk are output elasticities with respect to the characteristics of the
machines, this parameter is likely to be close to unity. Therefore I present herewith the closed
form solution for the wage functions for nk = 1 and nk = 2.
For nk = 1, equilibrium wages are given by:
w1(e1ab1) = ew + p1em11 1εabm11
µ
1 +
m1
m1 + r1
abr11
¶
w2(e2ab2) = ew + p2em22 11− εabm22
µ
1 +
m2
m2 + r2
abr22
¶
For nk = 2, equilibrium wages are given by:
w1(e1ab1) = ew + p1em11 µ1ε
¶2
×
µ
abm11 (1 + ab
r1
1 )
2 − 2r1abm1+r11 (
1
m1 + r1
+
1
m1 + 2r1
abr11 )
¶
w2(e2ab2) = ew + p2em22 µ 11− ε
¶2
×
µ
abm22 (1 + ab
r2
2 )
2 − 2r2abm2+r22 (
1
m2 + r2
+
1
m2 + 2r2
abr22 )
¶
5.5 Simulations
Can the model developed in this paper reproduce the changes in the wage structure observed
in the last decades in the US? To answer this question, I use the parametric specification of
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sections 5.1 to 5.3 and look for parameters that best fit (changes in) the wage distribution
for three key years, namely 1965, 1980 and 1995. These three years are selected because
the evolution of the wage structure between 1965 and 1980 and between 1980 and 1995 was
remarkable. While within wage inequality rose sharply and steadily over the whole period, the
between wage inequality, as measured by the college premium, only started to rise from 1980
onwards. Moreover, while wages rose everywhere in the distribution between 1965 and 1980,
the wage at the 1st decile decreased by 20% points between 1980 and 1995 to settle at 10%
points below its 1965 level. The three years selected and the two periods they define provide
therefore a good test for the model. Especially the diﬀerential timing of between and within
wage inequality and the drop in the wage at the 1st decile are of interest.
The model has 13 parameters (pj,mj, nj, rj, dj and ej for j = 1, 2 and ew) which means that
allowing each parameter to take x possible values on their respective domain, x13 simulations
should be run. To reduce the computational burden, I first reduce the dimensionality of the
problem by setting arbitrarily ew = 1, e1 = e2 = 1 and d1 = d2 = 4 so that the distribution
of tasks is bell-shaped and constant over time. Preliminary simulations failed to provide
numerical results for mj > 2. I therefore restrict the domain of mj to the interval [0.5; 2].
Also, the domain of nj is restricted to the interval [0.5; 3], the domain of pj to [0.5; 3] and the
domain of rj to [3; 18].
For each of the 385,000 simulations ran,31 values of the parameters rj, pj, mj and nj were
drawn at random from their respective intervals. Each simulation is evaluated as a potential
candidate to represent each year 1965, 1980 or 1995. In a first stage, I select for each year a set
of simulations out of the 385,000 simulations. The selection is based on how well the generated
wage structure fits the observed wage structures in that year. To evaluate the goodness of
fit, I focused on 2 summary measures, namely the skill premium and the relative supply of
college graduates. The skill-premium is measured by the (log) ratio of the median wage of
college graduates to the median wage of high-school graduates and corresponding observations
are taken from Figure 1 in Acemoglu (2002) and reported in the columns Data in Table 3.32
31Note that this is approximatively equivalent to a grid search where each of the 8 parameters takes on 5
diﬀerent values, i.e. 58 = 390, 625.
32Note that Acemoglu (2002) uses the log of the average wage of college to high-school graduates (conditional
on other explanatory variables). Unfortunately, the model does not produces closed form solution for the wage
functions for all parameter values. Hence, while quantiles of the distribution of the wage distribution are readily
accessible through numerical approximations, moments of the distribution (and hence the mean and variance)
require numerical integrations of the wage distribution. I therefore herewith proxy the college premium as the
log of the ratio of the median wage of college graduates to median wage of high-school graduates.
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The relative supply of college graduates will be compared to observations provided in Figure
1 in Acemoglu (2002). Hence, for each year, I keep only those simulations for which both
the generated relative supply and skill premium miss the target by less than 4%.33 After this
selection, there remained 89 simulations for 1965, 58 simulations for 1980 and 14 simulations
for 1995.
The second stage consists of linking simulations from each year so as to generate a “time-
series”. Although there are 89 × 58 × 14 = 72, 268 possible time-series only those for which
the evolution of the wage at the 1st decile of the overall distribution was closed enough to the
observed behavior of the wage at the 1st decile were selected. The wage at the 1st decile of
the overall wage distribution is proxied by the wage of the 1st decile of high-school graduates,
and compared to observations shown in Figure 2 in Acemoglu (2002) and reported in Table
3. The goodness of fit was measured by the average of the errors for the change between 1965
and 1980 and between 1980 and 1995 and the selection criterion was set at the 5% level. Only
those 2,067 time-series for which the average errors were less than 5% were selected for further
investigation.
Finally, in the third stage, out of the 2,067 remaining time-series, I selected the two time-
series for which the evolution of the wage gap between the 9th and 5th deciles and between
the 9th and 1st deciles within education fitted the data best. Since the model generates two
within wage distributions, one per education, I took the average of the two distributions to
measure the within wage gaps. The generated within wage gaps are compared to the residual
(log) wage gaps shown in Figure 3 in Acemoglu (2002) and reported in Table 3. Once again,
the goodness of fit is measured by the mean errors for the 2 gaps in the 2 periods Both
selected time-series had a goodness of fit approximately 97%.
The parameters associated to the two series are reported in Table 3. Remarkably enough,
referring to a 50% change in a parameter as a large one, in both simulations, large changes in
the productivity parameters occur between 1980 and 1995. In simulation I, changes occur for
manual skills whereas in simulation II changes occur for intellectual skills. In simulation I, the
slope of the productivity of manual workers p1 drops while the technical factor contributes to an
increase in productivity (the output elasticity with respect to tasks n1 increases). This would
33When set at the 5% level, 134 simulations for 1965, 101 for 1980 and 19 for 1995 are selected. This means
that 257,146 time-series must be generated in stage 2. Hence, setting the significance level at 4%, only 72,268
time-series need to be generated, which is still a significant amount but reduces the computational burden by
a factor 3.6.
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mean that the tasks (machines) to which manual workers have been assigned have become
more productive over time especially those tasks extremely manual (close to 0). On the other
hand, simulation II tends to indicate that the slope of the productivity of intellectual workers
has increased between 1980 and 1995 (which could either reflect an increase in the productivity
of their machines or an increase in the technique they use to operate their machines) while
the human factor has contributed to a decrease in productivity especially in very intelectual
tasks (close to 1) (the output elasticity with respect to intellectual skills decreases).
Although productivity parameters fluctuates between 1965 and 1980 in both simulations,
the most remarkable changes between 1965 and 1980 are those observed for the mapping
function parameters rj. Since the distribution of tasks has been held constant, these changes
in the mapping function over time can only be due to changes in the distribution of skills
over time. This is of course in part the result of self-selection −the share of college graduates
increases over the whole period− but could also be due to changes in the distribution of
abilities over time. And since the exact definition of abilities in the model encompasses pure
ability endowment individuals were born with and the contribution of factors aﬀecting a child’s
ability vector up until the end of compulsory education, changes in ξ(ab1, ab2) could either be
due to genetics (changes in pure ability endowments) or changes in factors aﬀecting a child’s
abilities up until the end of compulsory education, i.e. family background and environment.
This is an interesting possibility that requires a proper experimental setting to be tested. It
is important, however, to bear in mind that the simulations ran above are not such a setting
and should not be taken as such. The simulations can not help us to isolate which sources are
responsible for what share of the changes in the wage distribution but they at least spells out
which sources can be responsible for the changes in the wage distribution over time.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributed to the literature on assignment models by presenting a general equi-
librium assignment model that acknowledges the multidimensionality of skills and account
for endogenous human capital formation through educational self-selection. The main char-
acteristic of this model is that two types of assignment occur. The first type of assignment
is workers’s educational self-selection. Education is a mean for workers to transform their
initially endowed abilities into marketable skills. Diﬀerent education transform abilities of
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the two types in diﬀerent proportions. Under mild conditions, spelled out in Assumption A1,
workers specialize and supply their skills of the type that maximizes their earnings.
The second type of assignment is the assignment of workers to tasks. Each task is associated
with a unit of capital, a machine for the sake of the argument, and the various tasks correspond
to machines with diﬀerent characteristics. To produce output, each machine needs to be
operated by a fixed proportion of workers, i.e. one and only one worker to eliminate the
intensive margin. The owner of a machine is loosely referred to as a firm. Although the
various machines can be operated by workers with diﬀerent types and levels of skills, workers
of diﬀerent types and levels of skills diﬀer in their productivity. I show that if the productivity
of worker-task pairs satisfies assumption A2 then, following Ricardo’s principles of comparative
advantage and diﬀerential rents, equilibrium in this model is characterized by two mapping
functions, one for each type of skills supplied. The first mapping function is decreasing and
maps skills of the first type to tasks on the left hand side of the support. The second mapping
function is increasing and maps skills of the other type to tasks on the right hand side of
the support. These two mapping functions generate two wage functions, one for each type of
skills, that will in general overlap.
The multidimensionality of skills and self-selection is a unique asset of the model within
the class of general equilibrium assignment models. This asset is fundamental to keep up with
the recent empirical literature led by Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) that emphasizes the
importance of noncognitive skills, such as personality traits, in explaining earnings. In addition
to the multidimensionality of skills, self-selection oﬀers to the model a natural explanation for
the persistent overlap of the wage distributions of workers with diﬀerent education (see Figure
1). In his seminal paper, Roy (1951) indeed spelled out the consequences of self-selection
on the distribution of earnings. In his famous example of trout fishing and rabbit hunting
economy, Roy showed that, unless abilities at fishing and hunting are perfectly and positively
correlated, or stated otherwise, unless the rank of villagers is constant across abilities, the
distribution of wages of hunters will overlap the distribution of wages of fishers.
This paper argues that general equilibrium assignment models oﬀer a unique framework to
study the impact of technical change on the wage structure. Assignment models enable us to
distinguish between the contribution of human factors and the contribution of technical factors
in rising wage inequality. While technical factors are directly linked to technical change, the
human factors could take several forms. They could reflect changes in the way workers use
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their machines or perform their tasks −that is a change in the technique− or changes in the
distribution of skills. In contrast to existing assignment models, educational self-selection in
the model enables us to further distinguish between changes in the distribution of skills that
come from changes in school (college) quality, i.e. changes in Ej, from changes that come
from changes in the distribution of abilities, i.e. changes in ξ(ab1, ab2). The exact definition
of abilities in the model encompasses pure ability endowment individuals were born with
and the contribution of factors aﬀecting a child’s ability vector up until the end of compulsory
education. Hence changes in ξ(ab1, ab2) could either be due to genetics (changes in pure ability
endowments) or changes in factors aﬀecting a child’s abilities up until the end of compulsory
education, i.e. family background and environment.
The numerical simulations ran in the paper have shown that the model can reproduce
stylized facts hard to explain in a unified model, i.e. i) the overlap in the wage distributions
of college and high-school graduates, ii) the diﬀerential behavior of the between and within
wage inequality in the 70s and, iii) the decline of the wage at the 1st decile of the overall
wage distribution after 1980. Especially the decline of the wage at the 1st decile of the wage
distribution has been hard to interpret in models of technical change. Standard models of
technical change would predict an increase in the wage at all deciles or at least a stagnant
wage at the lowest deciles if new (more productive) technologies are not used by low wage
workers.34 That the assignment model with endogenous human capital formation is able to
reproduce this stylized fact is a particularly important asset, but it raises the question: how
can the model explain this decline?
The answer to this question is straightforward once we recognize that wages in the model
reflect the productivity of worker-task pairs in equilibrium. The decline of the wage of workers
at the 1st decile indicates that the productivity of the workers at the 1st decile has decreased
over time. There are three possible reasons for that to have happened:
1. The machine or task to which workers at the 1st decile are assigned have become less
productive,
2. workers at the 1st decile operate their machines in a less productive way and,
34Note that some other studies have proposed explanations for the fall of the wage at the 1st decile. For
instance, Galor and Moav (2000) argue that the drop follows from the “erosion eﬀect” created by new tehc-
nologies, Acemoglu (1999) and Caselli (1999) argue that the capital-labor ratio for low wage workers falls as
firms respond to technical change and Autor et al. (2003) suggests that computers substitute labor in manual
routine tasks.
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3. workers at the 1st decile in 1995 have less skills than workers at the 1st decile in 1980.
The first two reasons are very similar to the traditional technical change approach and
hence suﬀer the same critics. In contrast, the third explanation is very plausible. As mentioned
above, skills in the model are endogenous and depend on the educational production Ej and
abilities which in turn depend on pure endowed abilities workers were born with and family
background and environment during childhood. In this context, the model tells us that the
decline in the skills supplied by workers at the 1st decile could be either due to a decrease in
the educational production Ej, a decline in the endowed abilities or a worsening of the family
situation and environment of workers at the 1st decile when they were children. Of the three
explanations, the last one is certainly the most likely. Indeed, if anything, school quality has
improved in the US between 1980 and 1995, see Card and Krueger (1992) for instance, and
even if innate abilities are transmitted genetically, the process is most likely mean-reverting.
However, it is plausible that the family background and social environment in general during
the childhood of the worker at the 1st decile in 1980 was more favorable in terms of ability
development than that of the worker at the 1st decile in 1995.
Finally, note that Autor et al. (2007) have argued that the wage polarization observed
in the US in the 90s has been the result of a job polarization. Assignment models tells
us that wage polarization could come about for two reasons: a S-shaparization of the wage
function(s) Wj(abj(v)) due to changes in the productivity of worker-task pairs at constant
tasks (and skill) distribution or job polarization (changes in d(v)). Hence job polarization
is a suﬃcient condition for wage polarization yet not a necessary one. Just like standard
assignment models, the assignment model proposed in this paper could easily capture this job
polarization by allowing d(v) to change over time. However, to highlight the fact that job
polarization is not a necessary condition for the observed wage polarization, in this paper,
simulations were ran holding d(v) constant over time. These simulations have shown that it
was possible to reproduce an increase in wage inequality simultaneously with a drop in the
wage at the first decile which is an indication of wage polarization. Hence, the model put
forward an alternative explanation for the wage polarization observed in the US in the 90s,
namely a worsening of the factors aﬀecting children’s’ abilities formation over time or at least
between the childhood period of the worker at the 1st decile in 1980 and the childhood period
of the worker at the 1st decile in 1995.
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Appendix
The data used to estimate the overlap of the wage distribution of high-school and college
graduates are the CPS March supplements from 1964 to 2003. Since the model studies edu-
cational choice college drop outs are herewith classified with college graduates for they chose
to go to college. Workers working less than 38 hours and less than 39 weeks were excluded as
well as self-employed. Furthermore, each year sample includes only white males aged between
18 and 65 and all observations missing crucial information on wages, hours, weeks worked,
education, industry and occupation are deleted.
The wage measure used is the hourly earnings of full-time full-weeks workers defined as
the annual earnings divided by total weeks worked and total hours worked.35 The hourly
earnings are then deflated by the CPI-U (the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
provided by the US department of Labor), to obtain a measure of real hourly earnings in 1996
US dollars.
As Katz and Murphy (1992), I excluded workers with real hourly earnings below one half
of the real minimum wage of each year.36 For the samples from 1964 to 1988, following Katz
and Murphy (1992), I imputed to workers with topcoded earnings, annual earnings equal to
1.45 times the topcode amount. The factor 1.45 corresponds to the ratio of the estimated
conditional average earnings of those with topcoded earnings by the topcode amount. From
1989 on, wage and salary incomes are collected into two separate variables, primary and
secondary labor earnings, each with a diﬀerent topcode amount. After adjusting for the
topcodes, the primary and secondary earnings are added to form the annual earnings. For
the primary earnings, workers with topcoded earnings were assigned the topcode until 1995. I
multiply the values by 1.45 to obtain the primary earnings adjusted for topcodes. After 1996,
topcoded workers were assigned the mean of all topcoded workers. I impute these workers the
topcode times 1.45. For the secondary earnings, topcoded workers were assigned the topcoded
value. I therefore impute these workers the topcode value times 1.45.
35Conform to the literature, for the 1964-1975 samples for which only interval of weeks worked are available,
I imputed the mid-range of each interval.
36The series of nominal and real minimum wage rates are reported by the US department of Labor. The
real series is obtained by deflating the nominal series by the CPI-U price index.
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Figure 1: Overlapping wage distributions of College and High-school graduates. White males with equal experience (0-4 years) working
full time full weeks. Overlap is the Mann-Whitney statistic defined as the percentage of randomly chosen high-school graduates earning
above randomly chosen college graduates.
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Figure 3: Tasks assignment. The figure is generated using the parametric specification 5.1-5.3 with: p1 = 1.7, p2 = 1.9, m1 = 2,
m2 = 1.5, n1 = n2 = 2.65, e1 = e2 = 1, r1 = 4.5, r2 = 7, d1 = d2 = 4 and ew = 1.
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Table 1: Example: Assignment and wage distribution at the initial conditions.
Ability types 2
Levels L M H Na1J W1J L
a
1J
H 8 9 16 33 3 25
1 M 9 16 9 34 2 17
L 16 9 8 33 1 8
Na2J 33 34 33 100
W2J 1 2 3 L1. = 50
La2J 8 17 25 L2. = 50
Summary Statistics: Mean Withinb Overlapc
High-school 2.3 0.54
College 2.3 0.54
Between 1 100%
aNote that NiJ refers to the marginal density of workers with level J
of ability of type i in the economy. In contrast, LiJ is the conditional density
in equilibrium (given the wage rates) or employment.
bWithin wage inequality is measured herewith by the wage variance
within education
cThe overlap is measured herewith by the Mann-Whitney statistic.
This statistic is equal to the probability that a randomly chosen worker with
high-school education (ability1) earns at least as much as
a randomly chosen college graduate
(with ability2).
In this example, this statistic is 1 since the wage distribution are identical.
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Table 2: Example: The impact of technical change on assignment and wages.
Ability types 2
Levels L M H Na1J W1J L
a
1J
H 8 9 16 33 8 17
1 M 9 16 9 34 4 17
L 16 9 8 33 1 0
Na2J 33 34 33 100
W2J 2 4 9 L1. = 34
La2J 16 17 33 L2. = 66
Summary Statistics: Mean Withinb Overlapc
High-school 6 4.3
College 6 9.3
Between 1 17×16+17×33
34×66 = 37%
aNote that NiJ refers to the marginal density of workers with level J
of ability of type i in the economy. In contrast, LiJ is the conditional density
in equilibrium (given the wage rates) or employment.
bWithin wage inequality is measured herewith by the wage variance
within education.
cThe overlap is measured herewith by the Mann-Whitney statistic.
This statistic is equal to the probability that a randomly chosen worker with
high-school education (ability1) earn at least as much as
a randomly chosen college graduate
(with ability2).
In this example, this statistic is given by
Pr (ability1 is M and ability2 is L) +
Pr (ability1 is H and ability2 is at most M)
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Table 3: Simulations of the model: Wage distribution in the US 1965-1980-1995.
1965 1980 1995
Parameters Model Data∗ Model Data∗ Model Data∗
I II I II I II
p1 2.55 2.94 2.69 2.89 0.94 2.18
p2 1.04 2.09 1.20 2.03 1.53 2.96
m1 1.78 1.09 1.49 1.58 1.44 1.60
m2 1.14 1.50 1.05 1.89 0.65 0.88
n1 1.47 2.09 1.64 2.20 2.75 2.51
n2 1.97 1.85 2.24 2.26 2.30 2.22
r1 6.77 5.66 4.84 6.66 4.66 4.67
r2 10.25 7.64 17.92 16.00 14.97 17.36
S2/S1 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.68 0.68 0.70
ln
w
(5)
2
w
(5)
1
0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.60 0.61 0.60
w
(1)
1 100 100 100 106 107 113 87 84 87
ln w
(9)
w(5)
100 100 100 107 110 107 125 120 117
ln w
(9)
w(1)
100 100 100 107 109 111 112 119 113
Note: for each year and each model we have ej = 1, dj = 4 and ew = 1.
∗Source: Acemoglu (2002), Figures 1, 2 and 3.
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